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GoVERninG tHE intERioR
Extraordinary forms of rule  
and the regional party apparatus in the Second World War
one of the salient features of the Soviet system created in the 1930s was the ease 
which it shifted to extraordinary forms of administration and control.1 Within weeks 
of the war, the regime switched to a “special wartime system” of decision-making 
which saw the launch of emergency ad-hoc agencies, the delegation of carte blanche 
authority to Stalin’s deputies, and the widespread use of plenipotentiaries mandated 
to achieve the centre’s latest priorities. Yet as the war progressed this emergency 
system began to throw up problems of its own. in the economy, the conversion 
of industry to munitions production was taken too far, so that by 1942 it was the 
dwindling stocks of coal, oil, iron and steel, rather than limited munitions capacity 
which became the key factor impeding the Soviet war effort.2 in the political sphere 
the sweeping delegation of powers to plenipotentiaries and emergency committees 
led to confusion and local skirmishes as temporary representatives of the centre 
ran into opposition from established regional interests. the presence in the regions 
of transient command structures also raised larger questions about the longer-term 
purpose of the regional party bureaucracy. this essay explores how these tensions 
were resolved, as regional party organizations began to reach out for a new role in 
the post-war order.
1.  this phrase, used interchangeably with “special wartime system of administration and 
control,” is from Sanford R. lieberman, “the Evacuation of industry in the Soviet union During 
World War ii,” Soviet Studies, 35, 1 (1983): 90-91; and lieberman, “Crisis Management in the 
uSSR: Wartime System of Administration and Control,” in Susan linz, ed. the impact of 
World War ii on the Soviet union (totowa: Rowman and Allanhead, 1985), 59. 
2. john Barber and Mark Harrison, the Soviet Home Front 1941-1945: A Social and Economic 
History of the uSSR in World War ii (london: longman, 1991), 132, 136.
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the notion of an “extraordinary system of administration” has largely been 
applied to the very irst phase of the war, to describe the improvised management 
of emergency policies, such as the evacuation of over 1,500 industrial plants from 
the front line to the Soviet rear from july to november 1941.3 The irst six months 
of the conlict saw the introduction of a number of impromptu structures, such as 
the Evacuation Council, the State Defense Committee (Gko) and the local urban 
Defense Committees (Gorkos).4 This period of the war was however quite unusual. 
Even by its own grim standards, the Soviet regime was highly coercive during 
these months, which saw the summary execution of a string of military leaders, 
the threatened arrest of plant managers who failed to meet their targets,5 and the 
infamous orders “not a Step Back” and “on Capture” of 28 july and 16 August 
1941 by which soldiers who ceded territory or who surrendered were to be shot. 
According to Mark Harrison, until the Red Army and war production stabilized at 
a higher level —roughly speaking, in the second half of 1942— the Soviet army 
and political society were held together by a “wave of repressive measures.”6 
in this article i examine what happened when these measures began to subside. 
Were the regime’s efforts to address the disproportions in the economy matched by a 
corresponding effort to rebalance the political system, and if so, with what results? 
Much of what has been written about the wartime system of governance 
has focused on its apex, the State Defense Committee, based in Moscow.7 
3. lieberman, “the Evacuation of industry,” 90-91; and lieberman, “Crisis Management in 
the uSSR,” 66-71.
4. on how unplanned these structures were, see Rebecca Manley, to the tashkent Station: 
Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet union at War (ithaca: Cornell university Press, 2009), 
21, 24-27; V.n. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo v velikoi otechestvennoi voine: fenomenon 
chrezvichainykh organov vlasti 1941-1945 gg. (Saratov: izdatel´stvo saratovskogo universiteta, 
2002), 35, 38-39, 45-47, 49.
5. in one of the best known examples a Gko resolution “o Zavode no.21” of 2 january 1942 
warned that in the event of production failures, the director of an aviation plant would be 
arrested and the obkom secretary responsible for aviation industry expelled from the party. 
on Stalin’s insistence this resolution was distributed to all commissariats and regional party 
committees and used as a model by Gko plenipotentiaries. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 
145; and see 79-81. in another well-known example, the director of the Magnitogorsk steel 
plant, G.i. nosov was warned by the Gko on 22 november 1941 that should the unloading of 
cargo trucks be delayed, he would be tried at a military tribunal. Valerii kucher, Magnitka v 
1941-1945 godakh: Podrobnosti, fakty, dokumenty. (M.: RAGS, 2010), 28.
6. Mark Harrison, “the Dictator and Defense,” in Mark Harrison, ed., Guns and Rubles: the 
Defense industry in the Stalinist State (new Haven: Yale, 2008), 23. in line with Harrison’s 
hypothesis, the number of executions carried out by the security services fell from 23,278 
in 1942 to 3,579 the following year (ibid., 14). For a more detailed discussion of the role of 
coercion in the first part of the war, see Mark Harrison, “the uSSR and total War: Why Didn’t 
the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942?” in Chickering et al, A World at total War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2005), 153-155.
7. See for example, n.ia. komarov, Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony postanovliaiet…
Dokumenty. Vospominaniia. kommentarii. (M.: Voenizdat, 1990); A.A. Pechenkin, 
“Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony v 1941 godu,” otechestvennaia istoriia, 4 (1994): 126-142; 
P.n. knyshevskii, “Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony: metody mobilizatsii trudovykh resursov,” 
Voprosy istorii 2, (1994); M.o. Demichev, “Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony: organizatsiia, 
polozhenie i rol´,” Velikaia otechestvennaia voina v otsenke molodykh (M., 1997); iu.A. Gor´kov, 
Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony postanovliaiet (1941-45) (M.: olMA-Press, 2002). 
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in certain respects, the Gko may be regarded as an effective institution of wartime 
leadership. For the duration of the war, during which it issued an unbroken run of 
almost 10,000 resolutions, its supreme authority was never questioned.8 Certainly, in 
terms of continuity and institutional coherence the GKO had no equal in the German 
system of wartime leadership and administration.9 However, the Gko was only one 
part of a far wider emergency system that kicked in at the beginning of the war. our 
interest lies in the system from a regional perspective. Whereas the Gko simply took 
over the powers and membership of the inner circle of the Politburo, the relationship 
between the emergency system of rule and the ordinary party organizations in 
the provinces was not so clear. While some attention has recently been paid to 
the Western peripheries of the Soviet union during the war, this article explores 
the system of regional governance away from the heat of battle, in the Soviet heartland, 
an important zone whose political arrangements have been largely neglected.10 
the article begins with an assessment of what, following lieberman, we refer 
to as the “plenipotentiary system.”11 the Second World War was by no means 
the irst time that plenipotentiaries had been deployed by the Soviet regime in 
conditions of crisis. As with the Gko itself, ostensibly modelled on the Council 
of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense of the Civil War, plenipotentiaries had been 
widely used in the grain requisition campaigns of the civil war and collectivization 
periods.12 there were, however, important differences between the extraordinary 
system of administration of the Second World War and those that had preceded it. 
First, as V.n. Danilov has argued, the progressive concentration of power in Stalin’s 
8. Resolutions of the Gko were famously regarded as “immutable laws” possessing the 
“highest authority,” and implementing them was viewed as a binding and even “sacrosanct” 
duty on those below. See Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 78; kucher, Magnitka, 26.
9. on this, see Yoram Gorlizki and Hans Mommsen, “the Political (Dis)orders of Stalinism and 
national Socialism,” in Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, eds., Beyond totalitarianism: 
nazism and Stalinism Compared (new York: Cambridge university Press, 2009), 77-80.
10. For work on the regional administration of areas liberated from German control see, for 
example, Hiroaki kuromiya, Freedom and terror in the Donbas: a ukrainian-Russian borderland, 
1870s-1990s (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1998), chap. 7; Amir Weiner, Making 
Sense of War: the Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (new jersey: 
Princeton university Press, 2001); Geoffrey Swain, Between Stalin and Hitler: Class War and 
Race War on the Dvina, 1940-46 (london: Routledge, 2004); and Elena Zubkova, Pribaltika i 
kreml´ (M.: Rosspen, 2008).
11. the term “plenipotentiary system” was coined by lieberman, “Crisis Management,” 65-66.
12. Parallels between the Gko and the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense, and between 
the regional branches of the two, were often drawn in propaganda materials distributed at the 
beginning of the Second World War. See Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 20-22, 46-47. there 
were also numerous parallels with the “executive” plenipotentiaries of the collectivization and 
procurement campaigns of the early 1930s. Examples of the latter included the plenipotentiaries 
of the Procurements Committee (komzag) and the heads of the political departments of the 
Machine tractor Stations, who, in being directly subordinate to the Central Committee, were 
plenipotentiaries in all but name. Set up in january 1933, the latter positions were dissolved 
in november 1934 after reputedly having been captured by local interests. See R.W. Davies 
and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, the Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 Rev. ed. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 257-258, 358-363, 364; Alec nove, An Economic History of 
the uSSR, 2nd ed (london: Penguin, 1989), 172-174.
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hands in 1930s and the intertwining of party and state authority over the same 
period meant that there were fewer formal barriers to the absolute centralization 
of power in the Gko once the war started.13 Secondly, while plenipotentiaries had 
been used before, it is hard to say that they had evolved into a “system.” the best-
known plenipotentiaries in the Second World War were those of the State Defense 
Committee. Yet other institutions, such as the Evacuation Council, Gosplan, the 
All-union Council of trade unions, a large number of commissariats, and the City 
Defense Councils, also spawned plenipotentiaries of their own.14 in no other period 
was the use of plenipotentiaries as extensive or as institutionalized as it was during 
the Second World War. Among the most signiicant plenipotentiaries of this period 
were those of the Commission of Party Control who, during the war, attained a 
degree of authority that would be unparalleled in that institution’s history. The irst 
part of the paper examines the role of plenipotentiaries of the Gko and the kPk, 
and assesses their interaction over time with the regional party committees.
the second part of the essay looks more broadly at the role of the regional party 
committees (obkoms) of the interior. What did these organizations do? the paper 
centres on what, following XViii Party Conference of 1941, was supposed to have 
been the primary function of many of the obkoms, the coordination of industry. 
the article suggests that most regional party committees lacked the expertise, 
resources or authority to carry out this function adequately. The result was that in 
some areas where regional party organizations were expected to direct regional-
level industry they were more often than not “captured” by large-scale enterprises 
and their ministerial overseers. it was in recognition of this that towards the end of 
the war the central committee began to redirect the obkoms away from economic 
tutelage and towards what was perceived as “ideological leadership.” the article 
goes on to examine the quasi-military modes of leadership of many regional irst 
secretaries, most of whom were young vydvizhentsy who had come to ofice and 
been socialized into their new roles on the eve of the war or, in some cases, during 
the war itself. It then explores how conlicts between these often overbearing and 
sometimes near-tyrannical regional irst secretaries and the local aktivs burst out 
into the open as the Second World War neared its end. 
the plenipotentiary system
At the heart of the extraordinary system of rule that took hold at the beginning 
of the war was the “plenipotentiary system” in which selected individuals 
13. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 126-127, 391. in a supplementary argument, Danilov 
suggests that the Gko did not have to contend with parallel forums or decision-making bodies 
such as the Central Executive Committee (tsik), Party Congresses and Central Committee 
plenums, of the kind that had existed alongside the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense 
in 1919 (ibid., 65). 
14. on the plenipotentiaries of other organizations, see lieberman, “Wartime System,” 68; 
Manley, tashkent Station, 29-30; Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 112-113.
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were given mandates by the country’s top leadership in Moscow to implement 
high-priority local assignments. Plenipotentiaries were attached to a number of 
institutions, but the most high-ranking were the plenipotentiaries of the State 
Defense Committee, the irst of whom was appointed on 2 July 1941. While 
no oficial igures have ever been released, the most detailed trawl of the GKO 
archives identiied 73 GKO plenipotentiaries appointed in the irst six months 
of the war.15 the plenipotentiaries included commissars, enterprise directors, 
scientists, military leaders, security oficials and regional party secretaries. 
in principle, it was expected that the near-total mandates of authority to a 
plenipotentiary was suficient to override the objections of a local leader, even 
where the latter occupied a position that was more senior in the party-state 
hierarchy. A celebrated example was that of n. Voronov who in the autumn of 
1941 was sent to leningrad to supervise, as a Gko plenipotentiary, munitions 
production in the city. Voronov’s conlict with Zhdanov in Leningrad is well 
described by lieberman: 
Voronov quickly ran up against Zhdanov, the all-powerful party boss of 
leningrad. Zhdanov wished that more munitions be brought into leningrad 
from the outside, while Voronov, holding his own ground, asserted that the 
city’s industrial concerns could handle this task by themselves. Voronov won 
the argument—and one must surmise that at least in this instance, his having a speciic mandate from the GKO outweighed Zhdanov’s formal power and personal inluence.16
Yet while GKO plenipotentiaries were well equipped to achieve short-term 
or one-off assignments, it was not always easy to convert their mandate into 
a more routine type of authority. Without their own staff in the region, Gko 
plenipotentiaries normally had to rely on the ordinary party and state bureaucracies 
to carry out their orders. In dealing with obkom oficials on a day-to-day basis 
the plenipotentiary, especially if he was a local oficial, was liable to revert to his 
normal non-Gko status and to be treated as such by local staff. 
A good example of this comes from the krasnoe Sormovo tank factory in 
Gor´kii. in the early stage of the war, krasnoe Sormovo, which produced the 
strategically important T-34 tank, was the subject of the very irst GKO resolution, 
issued on 1 july 1941, which called for a sharp increase in tank production at the 
plant from September. on 20 october Stalin, impatient with the slow progress at 
the plant, sent a telegram to the Gor´kii obkom First Secretary, Rodionov, and 
to all the directors of the tank factories in the region, insisting that production 
should not fall below three tanks a day and that it should rise to 4-5 tanks per day 
by the end of the month.17 At the local level implementation of this command was 
15. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 82.
16. lieberman, “Crisis Management,” 73, fn.34. 
17. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 130, 141.
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given over to the Gko plenipotentiary in the region and obkom second secretary, 
kireev. A Central Committee report on krasnoe Sormovo recounted: 
The plan for tank production here has not been fulilled. However, Kireev is 
rarely seen at the plant and does little to provide it with any help. Rodionov 
[the obkom First Secretary] says that kireev was fully engaged with the plant when it was irst converted to the production of T-34s, however the period of 
conversion has long ended, and we now need decisive everyday measures for the fulilment of the programme. Kireev is not taking these measures, while Rodionov is not speciically involved in the plant, nor is he in any way pressing 
kireev to take this on.18
While some Gko plenipotentiaries were lionized, their appointments were 
not always a success. When the airplane designer and deputy commissar for 
aviation industry, A.S. Yakovlev, was sent out to a failing aviation plant, he 
came across a former army general who, in his capacity as Gko plenipotentiary, 
had taken to bypassing the factory director and chief engineer and issuing his 
own commands directly to the factory’s personnel. When Yakovlev questioned 
his tactics, the plenipotentiary countered by ishing out from a safe the GKO 
resolution authorizing his appointment and demonstratively pointing to Stalin’s 
signature on it.19 
As much as they may have derived their initial power and status from their position 
as Gko appointees, in the longer-term the authority of Gko plenipotentiaries 
depended on their own personal expertise and leadership qualities. Broadly 
speaking, the effectiveness of Gko plenipotentiaries and of the plenipotentiaries of 
the special emergency committees, such as the Evacuation Council, appears to have 
been at its greatest in the very irst phase of the war, when they were charged with 
quite speciic short-term tasks. As the war progressed, however, plenipotentiaries, 
especially where they were local oficials, tended to revert to their ordinary roles 
and to assume their pre-Gko statuses.
the tension between the extraordinary and regular systems of administration 
was also evident with a second category of plenipotentiary that came into its 
own during the war, that of the Commission of Party Control (kPk). As the war 
unfolded, the number of kPk representatives in the regions multiplied and their 
activities escalated. With 11 plenipotentiaries at the time of the kPk’s foundation 
in 1939, their numbers swelled to 59 by the spring of 1946, with each —unlike the 
plenipotentiaries of the Gko— having his own local staff, of anywhere between 
5 and 10 oficials. In order to secure their independence from the obkom, no 
plenipotentiary was allowed to serve longer than eighteen months in any one region 
and their operations were funded entirely from the Central Committee budget in 
18. RGASPi (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial´no-politicheskoi istorii), f. 17, op. 127, 
d. 153, l. 34.
19. A.S. Yakovlev, tsel´ Zhizni (M., 1970), 312, cited in Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 83.
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Moscow (rather than from the regional budget).20 Although a Central Committee 
resolution of May 1940 had instructed the kPk to focus its activities on local 
party organizations —rather than on state and economic agencies— as the war 
developed, the kPk was gradually sucked into overseeing the work of ministries 
and enterprises, especially over their implementation of Gko directives.21 
As part of a broader “extraordinary” system of administration, kPk 
plenipotentiaries were expected to be authoritative, self-standing agents who could 
press and goad regional irst secretaries into enacting the centre’s priorities. KPK 
plenipotentiaries were indeed often not shy in taking on regional irst secretaries. 
in krasnoiarsk in February 1945 it was the kPk plenipotentiary, Smirnov, who 
drew attention —much to the visible irritation of the First Secretary Aristov— 
to the shortcomings of the obkom buro. Aristov was indeed so incensed that he 
refused to let Smirnov speak again at the obkom plenum and fumed so visibly that, 
in the words of an oficial from the cadres administration at the Central Committee, 
he came close to “undermining the authority of his own position as First Secretary 
of the kraikom.” 22 in Primorskii krai in April 1945 it was the kPk plenipotentiary 
kosarev, who lambasted the “exceptional placidity and complacency of the [First 
Secretary] Pegov” and it was kosarev who served as the channel for other leading 
igures in the region, such as the second secretary, the propaganda secretary, the 
head of the organizational department, and others, to convey their dissatisfaction 
with Pegov to the centre.23 in Chkalovsk it was the kPk plenipotentiary, Maliutin, 
who, having attended several meetings of the obkom buro, reported to the centre that 
the First Secretary, Denisov, “often allows a half-hearted [neser’eznoe] approach to 
the resolutions of the Central Committee.” According to Maliutin, Denisov, “placed 
in doubt the implementation of resolutions of the Central Committee,” questioned 
the wisdom of certain plans, and claimed that “someone in the Central Committee 
apparatus is misinforming the [country’s] leadership.” 24
Despite their mandate to act as a decisive check on regional authorities, in the 
long-run kPk plenipotentiaries did not have the clout to seriously challenge the 
position of a regional boss. At its summit the kPk had an organ, the kPk buro, and 
a leader, A.A. Andreev, whose authority was on the wane. indeed, it was much to 
Andreev’s displeasure that an orgburo ruling of 21 April 1944 ordered that kPk 
plenipotentiaries send their materials to the Secretariat as well as to the kPk buro 
thereby, in the eyes of the kPk’s deputy chair, Shkiriatov, fostering duplication 
and parallelism and seriously undermining the position and reputation of the kPk 
20. RGASPi, f. 17 op.121, d. 462, l. 41, 43. Whereas originally all kPk plenipotentiaries were 
meant to have been members of the kPk Commission (whose size shrank from 31 members to 
13 during the war), over time this condition was relaxed. ibid., l. 37
21. ibid., l. 38-39.
22. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 55-56.
23. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 91, l. 18-19.
24. ibid., l.184-186.
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itself.25 A second reason for the limited ability of kPk plenipotentiaries to act 
as countervailing forces to the regional irst secretary was that they themselves 
were often low proile outsiders with a limited following in the region. When, for 
example, both the First Secretary of the Chuvash obkom, Charykov, and the Chair 
of the Republican Council of People’s Commissars, Matveev, were summoned 
to Moscow in December 1944 “all responsibility for running the republic” wrote 
the kPk plenipotentiary, logvin, “was supposed to rest with me, but given that 
Charykov has expressed his political distrust in me, carrying out my duties has 
proved to be dificult.”26
After the war, the Central Committee tried to address this problem by creating 
a new position, that of inspector that was to be illed by former regional irst 
secretaries.27 According to the Politburo resolution which established the position, 
“inspectors of the Central Committee should possess suficient experience of 
leading party work and be able to check up on and verify the work of obkoms, 
kraikoms and republican party committees and to issue, when in the localities, all 
necessary directives so that [these committees] improve their work.” to ensure 
their independence, inspectors were not to be stationed in or attached to any 
particular region, but to be based in Moscow and to go out on Central Committee 
assignments as and when required. The irst appointed inspectors, n.i. Gusarov, 
V.G. Zhavoronkov, and S.B. Zadionchenko were all seasoned former obkom irst 
secretaries, as were their line managers at the new Administration for Checking 
Party Agencies, set up in August 1946 to take charge of their operations, 
V.M. Andrianov, and S.D. ignat´ev.28 the new Administration may be regarded as 
a half-way house between the extensive wartime system of kPk plenipotentiaries 
and the ordinary Central Committee apparatus; indeed the extent to which the new 
inspectors usurped the roles of the KPK plenipotentiaries is relected in the decision, 
on 21 April 1947, to eliminate the position of the kPk plenipotentiary altogether.29 
However, even the newly beefed-up Administration soon ran into problems; in july 
1948 the Administration was dissolved and its activities merged into the ordinary 
cadres administration of the Central Committee.
The use of plenipotentiaries in the Soviet system was by no means unique to the 
Second World War. Plenipotentiaries had been widely used in the campaigns of the 
1930s and they would continue to be deployed under khrushchev. Such systematic 
and extensive use of plenipotentiaries as occurred during the war was, however, 
25. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 121, d. 462, l. 40-41.
26. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 89, l. 8.
27. In his first request for inspectors, dated 11 May 1946, the tsk Secretary in charge of 
this operation, Patolichev, called for very senior figures to be appointed, including the First 
Secretary of the Armenian Central Committee, G.A. Arutinov, the First Secretary of the 
karelian Republic, G.n. kuprianov, and four current regional first secretaries. RGASPi, f. 17, 
op. 121, d. 448, l. 4.
28. tsk VkP(b) i Regional´nye partiinye komitety 1945-1953 (M.: Rosspen, 2004), 16.
29. “Postanovlenie Politburo ob uprazdenii instituta upolnomochennykh kPk pri VkP (b)”, in 
tsk VkP(b) i Regional´nye partiinye komitety 1945-1953, 25.
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rare and, arguably, unique. Faced with the most dire of emergencies, the country’s 
leadership sought to cut through the ordinary regional bureaucracy and to appoint 
plenipotentiaries as direct agents of the centre. Plenipotentiaries were expected 
to goad regional leaders into exhibiting “greater tension” in their work and into 
meeting “higher expectations.” in the longer term, however, the plenipotentiary 
system was to prove unstable, leading to incessant clashes at the regional level and 
to a gnawing anxiety among regional oficials over how to weigh up the competing 
claims of their nominal regional bosses, the irst secretaries, against those of their 
kPk shadows. As with other agencies of the extraordinary system, such as the 
political departments of the Machine tractor Stations and sovkhozy, which had 
been re-established on 17 november 1941, but which were discontinued in 1943 
on account of their overlapping functions and conlicts with the raikomy, the 
plenipotentiary system drifted into a “chrezvychaishina,” literally an “excess of 
extraordinary measures,” which now called for corrective action.30 
the regional party apparatus: finding a new role
The scale of devastation wrought by the Second World War re-opened questions 
about the organization and identity of the whole political order.31 one of the 
most pressing issues concerned the regional party organization. What was its 
primary purpose? What role was it supposed to fulil? On the eve of the war, at 
the XViii party conference in February 1941, the regional apparat had been given 
an unambiguous steer to get more involved in the economy and, in particular, in 
the Soviet industrial economy. the conference ruled that all obkoms and kraikoms 
would have, in addition to the requisite irst, second and third secretaries, a number 
of branch secretaries specializing in particular ields of industry. In total, 393 “branch 
secretaries” covering 53 industrial specialisms were assigned to the regional party 
apparatuses.32 these secretaries were overwhelmingly young (90% were under the 
age of 40) and considerably better educated than the regional irst, second and third 
secretaries.33 the assignment of so many senior specialists-cum-political leaders at 
the regional level provided a sure signal that the regime was taking the new role of 
the obkom in industrial management seriously.
30. the term “chrezvychaishina” is used by Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 114. For a useful 
discussion of the MtS wartime political departments and of how they differed from their 
1933-1934 predecessors, see ibid., 61-63. 
31. this is one of the key themes of Amir Weiner’s Making Sense of War.
32. By 18 March 1941 333 or 84% of these positions had been filled. the “branch secretaries” 
covered general jurisdictions such as “industry,” “transport” and “transport and industry” but 
also much more specialized ones such as, for example, “defense industry” “timber industry” 
“food industry” “coal industry” “metallurgical industry” and so forth. RGASPi f.17 op.127 d.66 
ll.13-14. Given that there were 139 obkoms and kraikoms on 1 july 1941, this meant that on 
average every region had around two-three specialist industrial secretaries. 
33. 54% of the branch secretaries had a higher education, as opposed to 33% of the first, second 
and third secretaries. ibid., l. 15-16.
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With the advent of the war, this new emphasis on the party’s micro-management 
of industry appeared increasingly at odds with the major organizational and resource 
challenges that the party faced. First, with mass conscription there was a major 
movement of party members from the territorial party organizations to the army, 
so that by 1 july 1943 only 1,856,000 of the 3,213,000 who had been members at 
the beginning of the war remained attached to the territorial organizations, while 
the number of primary party organizations in the rear fell from 189,514 to 120,220. 
Further, within the territorial organizations the number of members working in 
industry had fallen from 900,000 on 1 january 1941 to 453,000 on 1 january 1943, 
while the number of workers at the bench dropped from 420,000 before the war to 
240,00 in September 1943.34 Given that there were fewer communists working in 
industry, it was not clear why territorial party organizations should have retained 
such a strong contingent of industrial specialists. Secondly, the beginning of the 
war witnessed a major decentralization of power within the industrial system 
to the commissariats. on 1 july 1941 the commissariats were given new powers to 
control investments and to allocate surplus resources among their own factories. 
At the same time commissars and deputy commissars were often expected to get 
more involved in the minutiae of production in large strategic plants. in the defense 
industry they were expected to provide daily reports on production levels to the 
Gko and, in some cases, especially at the beginning of the war, they were sent on 
local assignments to take personal charge of production campaigns at these plants. 
in the commissariats of aviation, tank production and non-ferrous metals, some 
factory directors were made deputy commissars.35 Ranged against such powerful 
high-status igures, freshly appointed obkom branch secretaries, many of whom 
were young and only recently out of institutions of higher learning, often had their 
work cut out trying to get their voices heard. 
thirdly, there were also tensions within the regional party organizations 
themselves. Some obkom irst secretaries felt out of their depth when it came to 
organizing a major operation around improving industrial performance. the 
appointment of branch industrial secretaries only highlighted the relative ignorance 
and lack of expertise of many obkom irst secretaries in industrial matters. On 1 April 
1942 the industry secretary in Altai, Solodko, wrote to the Central Committee 
complaining that despite the goals of the XViii Party Conference, the First Secretary 
in the Altai, lobkov, had shown nothing but “indifference” towards industry and 
preferred to spend his time on agriculture. Worse still, lobkov, presumably feeling 
threatened by Solodko, had, during the sowing season, posted Solodko for two 
months to positions in the countryside, and then repeatedly cut Solodko off from 
key meetings and decisions on industry.36 A report in May 1942 complained that 
the irst secretary in Gor´kii, Rodionov, was insuficiently engaged in industrial 
34. . RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 56, l. 43, 70. the drop in agriculture was even more marked, 
from 623,000 to 276,000
35. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 67-68; kucher, Magnitka, 15, 68, 73-74.
36. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 127, d. 153, l. 1-4, 6, 8.
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production and that this was relected in the shortages of raw materials and spare 
parts, as well as in the lack of order, at the krasnoe Sormovo and Molotov tank 
factories, both of which had succumbed to conlicts and internal disagreements. 
in an explanation, Rodionov complained that despite the fact that Gor´kii was an 
important industrial centre “agricultural issues continue to absorb much of his time 
and attention.”37 Criticisms of this kind continued to be levelled at regional party 
organizations for the duration of the war.38
Perhaps the biggest problem for the regime was that in the context of massive, 
almost unconstrained, wartime investment in the defense industry the commissariats 
and regional party organizations in effect colluded in what Mark Harrison and Andrei 
Markevich have referred to as a giant “job creation programme.”39 in the defense 
industry this process had been observed even before the war with the formation 
and fragmentation of new commissariats, each of which had a multiplier effect 
on the number of senior and middle level positions. According to the Commissar 
of Finances, A.G. Zverev, within the irst two years of the war, the appointment of 
factory heads as deputy commissars had led to a two-three fold increase in the total 
number of deputy commissars in the uSSR, with each appointment bringing in its 
wake further institutional subdivisions and a growth in support staff to populate 
them.40 over the war a similar process took hold of the regional party organizations, 
many of which seized on the instructions of XViii Party Conference to focus on 
the management of industry by creating large middle-level departments in this 
area. notwithstanding the marked decline in territorial party membership and the 
fall in the number of primary party organizations, regional party bureaucracies, 
especially in the interior, began to swell up. From 1940 and 1946 the number of 
executive oficials (otvetstvennye rabotniki) employed at the obkoms, kraikoms 
and republican apparatuses rose by over 70%, from 12,120 to 20,789. Although the 
reasons varied, and included the marked subdivision of some territorial units during 
the war, a prime factor appears to have been the growth of the party apparatus in 
the large industrial regions, especially those with large defense plants. thus, for 
example, over this period the number of executive party oficials in the Sverdlovsk 
apparatus grew from 133 to 224, in Cheliabinsk from 132 to 231, in Gor´kii from 
128 to 211 and in Molotov from 125 to 224.41 
37. ibid., l. 28-30, 37.
38. thus, for example, a Central Committee resolution condemning the poor leadership of 
industry in ivanovo of 11 october 1943 “o rabote ivanovskogo obkoma VkP(b)” was followed, 
in the summer of 1945, by a Central Committee report that continued to be highly critical of 
the obkom’s management of the textile industry, blaming the obkom for its inability to secure adequate supplies of raw materials and fuel for the region’s factories and for failing to provide 
enough workers for the second shift. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 88, l. 185-186.
39. Mark Harrison and Andrei Markevich, “Hierarchies and Markets: the Defense industry 
under Stalin,” in Harrison, ed., Guns and Rubles, 64.
40. Cited in Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 68.
41. these increases where proportionately greater than in agricultural districts and in the newly 
liberated areas. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 127, d. 1004, l. 19, 30.
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Funding these oficials presented the regime with particular problems, ones 
which would pose more general questions about the role of the party apparatus 
as a whole. once they had been appointed as regional party secretary, branch 
secretaries may have expected that their salaries would be commensurate with 
those of plant directors and other regional level economic oficials. However, under 
pay scales introduced in 1939 the salaries of obkom secretaries were considerably 
lower than their economic equivalents at the regional level such as plant directors 
and the regional heads of ministerial administrations.42 obkom pay packets were 
augmented by a variety of oficial emoluments, including a meal supplement of 
105 rubles a month, additional food supplies (measured by weight: 6 kg of meat, 
1 kg of fat, 2.4 kg of sugar and sweets etc. per month), welfare services of up 
to 2,000 rubles per month, manufactured goods of up to 1,000 rubles every half 
a year, as well as access to their own sanatoria, reading materials and radios.43 
Despite these supplements, party oficials, and especially those lower down the 
pecking order, were aggrieved at the disparities in basic pay between themselves 
and their factory and ministerial equivalents. In order to make up for this shortfall, 
factories paid out top-ups and bonuses and awarded prizes and handed out gifts to 
obkom party oficials, while these oficials, in turn, grew lenient in their treatment 
of their sponsors.44 
Equally worrying was the tendency of factories to create additional full-time 
party positions (osvobozhdennye sekretari) and then to pay the salaries for these 
posts out of their own budgets. A report on Gor´kii region in june 1945 showed that 
at the large krasnoe Sormovo plant, in addition to its 11 oficial osvobozhdennye 
sekretari, who were attached to party cells in workshops, and whose salaries were 
paid for out of the party budget, there were an extra nine who served party cells 
that were too small to warrant the establishment of such positions and whose salary 
was paid for by the factory. in the Dvigatel´ revoliutsiia and krasnaia Etna plants 
all the party cells fell into this category, but nonetheless the factory administration 
still sanctioned the creation of ten full-time party posts. in order to pull this off the 
factories artiicially inlated their staff numbers and created ictive well-paid senior 
positions from which the osvobozhennye sekretari drew their salaries.45 in addition, 
42. thus, for example, whereas a director of an enterprise of the ministry of transport 
industry could expect a salary of 2,500-3,000 rubles and a director of an enterprise of the 
ministry of defense 2,500-3,500, the glavk head from any of a range of industrial ministries 
could receive 2,500-3,000, and a glavk head of the ministry of internal affairs would get 
3,000-3,200 rubles, obkom first secretaries would receive no more than 1,400-2,000 rubles 
and gorkom first secretaries 1,00-1,700 rubles “that is in many cases lower than the salaries 
of directors of factories and other functionaries of economic organizations.” tsk VkP(b) i 
Regional´nye partiinye komitety 1945-1953, 144.
43. tsk VkP(b) i Regional´nye partiinye komitety 1945-1953, 145-151.
44. in some of the best known cases that would later come to light the secretary of the udmurtia 
obkom Chernykov was given a gold watch, the secretary of the kalinin obkom, Veselov, was 
awarded a hunting rifle, and the deputy secretary for timber and paper of the Molotov obkom 
was given a monthly salary top-up and valuable gifts. See ibid., 156.
45. Often the job specifications for these positions did not correspond to the actual qualifications 
of their ostensible holders. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 93-95.
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the factories often paid out large unearned bonuses to their party secretaries for 
jobs that they did not in fact do. At krasnoe Sormovo the secretary of the party 
organization, Artashin, in addition to his monthly “salary” of 1,450 rubles for a 
job that he did not do, received 4,256 rubles over the irst four months of 1945 
for supposedly “fulilling the plan.” The secretary of the party organization of 
workshop number 23 of the Stalin factory, Mironov, in addition to his basic salary 
of 1,000 rubles for his non-existent job as a senior foreman, received an additional 
3,400 rubles as a “bonus” for this imaginary position. Sometimes this bonus system 
deied all logic, even that dictated by the creation of ictional jobs. The secretary of 
workshop no.1 at Factory no.466, naloev, received 3,143 rubles from February to 
May 1945 for ostensibly leading a shift that overfulilled its plan, even though the 
workshop that he was supposed to have led —but did not— in fact under-fulilled 
its plan by around 30%.46
By the war’s end the regime had become concerned that, in the words of a Central 
Committee resolution on this subject, the “practice of awarding prizes and bonuses, 
and the receipt of tips and rewards is leading to an unhealthy relationship between 
party and economic agencies that bears the hallmark of corruption (nosit kharakter 
podkupa).” “By making party functionaries dependent on economic leaders and 
enmeshing them in relations of mututal protection (semeistvennosti) these practices 
prevent party functionaries from taking the economic agencies to task, so that they 
lose their very identity and become a plaything in the hands of economic interests.”47 
this issue was regarded as such a priority that very shortly after becoming Central 
Committee Secretary on 29 May 1946 Patolichev wrote to the Central Committee 
inspector and former obkom leader Andrianov instructing him to phone “all the 
obkom irst secretaries and agree to put an immediate end to the awarding of bonuses 
and prizes to party functionaries.” the following week Andrianov responded with 
a list of 113 representatives (mainly obkom irst secretaries) from whom he had 
received assurances on the matter.48 this was then followed up in August 1946 by a 
hard-hitting politburo resolution that lambasted these practices.49
The rise of bloated regional party bureaucracies and the cultivation of party oficials 
by the ministries fed into a broader sense during the latter part of the war that regional 
party organizations had lost their way. in light of the recent admission of millions 
of impressionable new members, many from the army, the regional party apparatus 
had to return to its core task and to instil in these new cadres a sense of the party’s 
historical mission. This required a shift in emphasis from economic management 
towards agitation and propaganda. Such was the thrust of a major reorganization of 
the obkoms launched in December 1946 which saw an increase in the overall staffs 
46. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 95-96.
47. tsk VkP(b) i Regional´nye partiinye komitety 1945-1953, 157.
48. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 121, d. 448, l. 5, 8-11.
49. “Postanovlenie Politburo o faktakh premirovaniia ministerstvami SSSR i khoziaistvennymi 
organizatsiiami rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov regionov,” tsk VkP(b) i Regional´nye partiinye 
komitety 1945-1953, 156-157.
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of the propaganda departments at the obkoms and kraikoms of 29% and swingeing 
cuts to the industrial branch departments of 47%.50 the wartime experiment of 
getting regional party bureaucracies to concentrate on industrial production would 
prove to be the historical high point of the party’s managerialist creed, to which it 
would only return, in a somewhat diluted form, under khrushchev. 
Extraordinary rule and party leadership in the regions
the second half of 1943 marked a new phase of the war for the regional party 
organizations of the interior. on 6 August 1943 a key Central Committee resolution 
designed to regularize relations between Moscow and the regional party committees 
was passed. the resolution enjoined the Secretariat, under Malenkov, to check the 
work of regional party committees, summon their irst secretaries to Moscow, and 
ensure their fulilment of central party directives.51 Formally speaking, for much of the 
war the Central Committee apparatus played second iddle to the GKO, issuing only 
200 resolutions, mainly on narrow party matters such as cadre issues, agriculture and 
ideology, by comparison with the almost 10,000 passed by the defense committee.52 
in fact, many of the resolutions of the Gko were processed by the Central Committee 
apparatus (along with that of Sovnarkom). However, some of the day-to-day work of 
checking up on the regular activities of the regional party organizations had lapsed, 
and the August degree was intended to breathe some life into this process. Hand 
in hand with this development, in the summer and autumn of 1943 the majority of 
urban defense committees (Gorkos) which, alongside the Gko plenipotentiaries, 
had been the main institutional arm of the extraordinary system of administration in 
the provinces, were wound down.53 the evolution of these urban defense committees 
merits attention, for it provides insights into the inner workings of the ordinary party 
apparatus and into the changing leadership styles of some local irst secretaries at the 
height of the extraordinary system in the irst half of the war.
Although the irst urban defense committees had emerged spontaneously in 
the summer of 1941, the main impetus for the formation of a network of defense 
committees was the Gko resolution no. 830s which sanctioned the formation of 
46 such committees on 22 october 1941.54
50. these recommendations which were for the first group of largest regions called for the 
number of staff in the industrial branch departments to be cut from 1,126 to 597. RGASPi, 
f. 17, op. 127, d. 1004, l. 20-21.
51. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1372, l. 173-175.
52. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 68.
53. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 126. 
54. the very first urban defense committees were set up in El´ni (Smolensk), kiev, odessa, 
talinn and leningrad in june and july 1941. Danilov suggests that Stalin was opposed to 
concentrating so much power in the hands of regional agencies that were not clearly part of a 
system of vertical centralism, and that he only relented in october, when the military situation 
became critical. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 45-46, 48-49.
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Although some of the urban committees were formed on the front line, a large 
number were also created in major centres of armaments production and transport 
nodes in the “operational rear” and in other towns in the “strategic rear.”55 
in all, by the time they began to be dismantled in mid-1943, 79 urban defense 
committees had been established. three features of these defense committees are 
worth noting. First, and perhaps unsurprisingly, those local defense committees 
that were located further away from the front were the least powerful and long-
lasting.56 Secondly, without exception, all the city defense committees, including 
those on the front line, were under the control of the local territorial party irst 
secretary. thus, while the vast majority of local defense committees consisted 
of four members —the party irst secretary, the head of the ispolkom, the head of 
the nkVD, and the local military committee— in all cases it was the party leader 
who chaired the Gorko and took operational command of it.57 indeed, according 
to Danilov, in their role as chair of the urban defense committee territorial irst 
secretaries tended to strengthen their power, as they were endowed with de 
jure authority over the ispolkom, the nkVD and the local military commander, 
authority that in peacetime they did not normally possess.58 Further, although the 
Gorkos were expressly not subordinate to higher party committees, or even to 
higher-ranking Gorkos, but only to the Gko, Danilov suggests that the fact that 
irst secretary who headed the GorKO combined this function with his role in 
the ordinary party apparatus meant that, over time, the Gorkos were informally 
absorbed into the normal party hierarchy.59 thirdly, their experience on the 
Gorkos, and in particular their everyday interaction with local military and 
nkVD leaders in a wartime environment, exacerbated the propensity of some 
local party leaders to govern through quasi-military forms of leadership.60 it was 
this tendency in particular that would lead to acute tensions between local party 
leaders and regional aktivs during the last phase of the war.
55. urban defense committees in the operational rear included those in Gor´kii, ivanovo, Penza, 
Saratov, Vologda, Yaroslavl´, tambov, Arkhangel´sk and Dagestan; those in the strategic rear 
included kirov, kuibyshev and tatarstan. See Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 125.
56. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 108, 110.
57. of the 79 urban defense committees, 62 had this composition of four ex-officio members, while the differences in the other 17 cases were quite marginal. The one GorKO that was 
not led by the territorial first secretary, Rostov, was itself significant, as although by rights 
it should have been headed by the second most important person in the region, the head of 
the ispolkom, it was in fact chaired by the obkom’s second secretary. Danilov, Sovetskoe 
gosudarstvo, 95-96.
58. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 390, 394.
59. Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 393-394.
60. An earlier version of this argument —which made no mention of the Gorkos— but which 
suggested that in the absence of an older generation of leaders at the regional level who had been 
eliminated during the purges and who might have constrained their actions, the new generation 
of young, wilful first secretaries were able to establish their own patterns of informal behaviour 
which, in conditions of war and military conflict, would prove to be extremely coercive, was 
made by Cynthia S. kaplan, “the impact of World War ii on the Party,” in linz, impact, 168.
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An early example of the tensions instilled by these quasi-military forms of party 
rule took place in kuibyshev. At the obkom plenum on 14 March 1943, which 
approved the removal of the obkom First Secretary, V.D. nikitin, it was observed 
that nikitin, who had earlier led the local Gorko, had resorted to “military-
bureaucratic” forms of governance. According to the head of the organizational-
instruction department of the Central Committee, Shamberg, “this is relected in 
too much rule by administrative command (administrirovanie), and in leadership 
of the party aktiv through orders and decrees.”61 As the war came to a close, other 
such examples came to light. one came from novosibirsk whose First Secretary, 
Kulagin, had, according to one report, “resorted to administrative rule, frequent 
threats, expulsion from the party, and criminal prosecutions as his main system for 
the leadership of cadres.” kulagin’s approach rubbed off on some of his raikom 
secretaries. “Cursing and slandering people is the common practice here, and its 
inest exponents include the raikom secretaries Gustov from the Iskitimskii district, 
koziavkin from the kupinskii district, and others. But the most shocking approach 
is that of Goriachev from the Barabinskii committee who, on any pretext addresses 
people as “Hitler” or “fascist” and threatens them with execution on the spot; things 
got so bad that certain communists have even come to refer to the raikom as the 
‘police district.’”62 in kurgansk the First Secretary tetiushchev regularly accused 
oficials of being “degenerates” and “scoundrels,” resorted to swearing and often 
threatened to throw people in prison for failing to comply with his wishes. over the 
course of 1944, tetiushchev had 244 kolkhoz chairmen sacked and 102 prosecuted. 
He would refer to them as “louts” (kham), “rascals” (podlets) and “saboteurs” and 
frequently warned that “we will throw you into the concentration camps.” This 
approach iltered through to other leading cadres in the province such as the head 
of the regional ispolkom, Molikov, of whom the secretary of the lebiazhevskii 
raikom complained: “Why is it that a person who is supposed bring up and educate 
our cadres carries out such acts of hooliganism, uses foul language and displays 
all-round a crude lack of culture?” A report on the regional party conference in 
kurgansk in February 1945 commented that “delegates at the conference dragged 
up many other examples of Molikov’s rudeness and tactlessness.”63 
Such behaviour did not go unpunished. At the February 1945 party conference 
tetiushchev was sacked as regional First secretary and there were strong protest 
votes against other members of his team. of the 232 delegates, 28 voted against 
the head of the agricultural department, 57 against the propaganda secretary while 
82 voted against Molikov.64 Sizeable votes against regional irst secretaries were 
indeed quite common at the regional party conferences held at the tail end of 
the war in February and March 1945. in krasnoiarsk, 15 voted against the First 
61. Cited in Danilov, Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, 124.
62. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 127, d. 733, l. 3, 9.
63. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 61-62, 66-69; op. 127, d. 733, l. 21-22, 31-32.
64. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 61, 65.
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Secretary Aristov, in Smolensk 19 voted against the First Secretary Popov and 
in Chkalovsk 29 voted against the First Secretary Denisov.65 While these leaders 
retained their positions, the First Secretary in Astrakhan, Golyshev, who had 
75 votes against him (out of 315 delegates), was not so lucky.66 there were also 
some very high votes against irst secretaries beyond the borders of the Russian 
Federation. thus, for example, in Central Asia in the north kazakhstan obkom 
81 delegates voted against the irst secretary while 119 voted against his equivalent 
in the Alma-Ata oblast.67
The Central Committee appears to have been discomited by these protest votes. 
A report to Malenkov “on the incorrect practices of certain party organizations 
in the conduct of their elections” of November 1945 noted that although irst 
secretaries in around a half a dozen regions got through the elections, this was only 
because the number of candidates did not exceed the number of positions on the 
ballot. the report pointed to cases in Baku and krasnodar where the membership of 
the regional party committee was raised to match the number of candidates. “this is 
a violation of the rules on party elections” wrote the deputy head of the organization 
and instruction department, Slepov: “it dilutes our inner party democracy and 
reduces the signiicance of the secret ballot.”68 Equally, a report on the election in 
Chkalovsk noted of the vote against the First Secretary, Denisov: “Had there been 
only one more candidate over and above the 75 on the secret ballot [i.e. the number 
of members on the obkom] Denisov would not have got through.”69
the regional party conferences at the beginning of 1945 were often volatile 
affairs that yielded striking votes of no conidence in the incumbent irst 
secretaries. often the reason for this was the highly oppressive leadership style 
of the irst secretary, a leadership style that was only sharpened by the common 
habits and behavioural patterns of war and, in many cases, by the experience of 
interacting with military and nkVD leaders on a daily basis.70 in this regard, as in 
many other respects, the dynamics of regional politics in the immediate post-war 
period stood in sharp relief to what was happening in Moscow. Whereas the years 
1945-1948 would see Stalin progressively curtailing the autonomy of his 
subordinates, the political standoffs and disagreements in many of the regions 
only deepened, leading to the sharp clashes and heavy protest votes across many 
provinces at the party conferences of 1948.71
65. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 18, 31, 56-57.
66. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 59-60.
67. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 118.
68. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 118-119.
69. RGASPi, f. 17, op. 122, d. 87, l. 18.
70. For an examination of this in the case of Vynnitsa, see Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War, 
chapter two.
71. oleg khlevniuk, “konsolidatsiia stalinskoi nomenklatury, 1945-1953,” 50-61 (paper 
presented at the university of Manchester, September 2008) (cited with permission). 
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Conclusion
there has been a vogue over the last twenty years to study the Western peripheries 
of the Soviet union, and especially those areas that experienced both German and 
Soviet occupation, in 1940s.72 one merit of such an approach is that it allows us to 
compare the effects of the two regimes and their “illiberal subjectivities” side by 
side. While these studies are valuable, the dynamics of political rule in the Western 
peripheries were often quite different from those in the Soviet heartland. For this 
reason there are dificulties in projecting the experience of the Western borderlands 
onto the Soviet system as a whole. Coercion certainly continued to play a very 
important role in the Soviet interior for the duration of Stalin’s rule (and beyond). 
to take one example, during the war many large defense plants remained heavily 
dependent on slave labour.73 At the same time the preoccupation with “cleansing,” 
“purging,” and with the rooting out of “enemies” —a common feature of political 
discourse in the borderlands— did not loom as large in the interior.74 there, by 
and large, for most of the post-war period the local security police appear to have 
settled into quite cozy relationships with the regional party committees.75 With 
the exception of the leningrad Affair and its regional offshoots in the Crimea 
and Gor´kii, regional purges in the Soviet heartland during the war and the early 
post-war periods were surprisingly modest in scope. 
the relationship between the extraordinary, wartime system of governance and 
the ordinary mechanisms of rule during the war provides certain insights into the 
political life of the interior. the evidence examined in this paper suggests that once 
levels of economic production had begun to stabilize at a higher level from around 
mid-1942 some of the extraordinary forms of administration and control (Gko and 
kPk plenipotentiaries) began to collide with established party forms of authority 
and to be absorbed by them. In other cases, even at the height of the conlict in 
1941-1942, special wartime forms of government, such as the Gorkos, were in 
effect subordinated to regional party leaders and integrated into the civilian system 
72. Although technically it went beyond the borders of the Soviet regime, one of the first 
works in this vein was jan Gross’s two-volume opus, Polish society under German occupation: 
the General gouvernement, 1939-1944 (Princeton, n.j: Princeton university Press, 1979); 
and Revolution from abroad: the Soviet conquest of Poland’s western Ukraine and western 
Belorussia (Princeton, n.j.: Princeton university Press, 1989). 
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of administration. Rather than dislodging the ordinary system of party rule, some 
of the emergency instruments of government injected new life into it, by giving 
regional party leaders yet more formal power and widening their jurisdiction 
over other institutions. However, day-to-day dealings with military and police 
commanders came at a cost, for they accentuated a propensity among some regional 
irst secretaries to govern through exhortation and force. As a result, many of the 
regional party conferences that took place in the mid-1940s were turbulent affairs, 
as sharp conlicts among oficials burst out into the open, resulting in heavy protest 
votes against incumbent irst secretaries, votes that in many cases would lead to 
their downfall.
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